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ELECTRICAL QUALITY ASSURANCE  
D. Bozzini 
 
The electrical integrity and the safe operation of the 
superconducting electrical circuits are crucial issues for 
the successful commissioning with and without beam and 
for the operation of the LHC machine. Beam based 
measurements may require in-situ verification of the 
magnet polarities. The detection, diagnostics, repair and 
re-qualification of electrical faults and the verification of 
magnet polarities will inevitably have an impact on the 
machine availability.  
 
The experience gained during the String experiments 
shows that we ought to be prepared for unpredictable 
faults of any nature requiring interventions even including 
the opening of interconnections.  The experience needed 
for the ELQA activities during beam commissioning will 
be acquired during the phases of assembly and hardware 
commissioning. The success of the ELQA is based on the 
availability of experienced and well trained personnel. As 
of spring 2007 the resources allocated to the ELQA 
activities are, however, not assured. 
 
REPORT FROM THE MAGNET 
POLARITY COORDINATOR  
S. Russenschuck  
 
At an international review on the electrical quality 
assurance (ELQA) for the LHC, it was recommended that 
the coherence between magnet construction and 
measurement on one side, and the magnet interconnection 
according to the layout database with the hard and 
software for the electrical quality assurance (ELQA) on 
the other side must be established. The same 
understanding and application of the engineering 
specification for LHC magnet polarities by all teams 
involved has to be ensured. Therefore a Magnet Polarity 
Coordinator was appointed. The first status report was 
concerned with the confusion resulting from the same 
multipole field error definition in the two different 
reference frames (magnet measurement frame and 
moving frame of Beam 1 for beam physics calculations) 
which may result in polarity errors of the vertical orbit 
correctors and a wrong treatment of measured skew 
multipole errors in the beam physics program MAD.  
 
Unlike stated in an older version of the EDMS 
document No. 90042, the polarity conventions do not 
follow the beam physics conventions. The polarity 
conventions are compatible with the conventions in the 
Beam 1 frame as far as the normal multipoles are 
concerned. They are not coherent with the MAD 
conventions for the skew multipoles.  
 
The second subject treated in the presentation was the 
worry about the polarity of the main quadrupoles, as the 
approved layout drawing turned out to be wrong. The 
error was corrected in the production drawing for the cold 
mass integrator. As obviously the design of the magnet 
interconnections and bus bar routings was not done 
according to the approved layout, the polarity is correct 
for the series production of the magnets.  
 
Finally, the concern about the continuity of the bus bars 
for the spool piece corrector magnets was expressed. The 
routing of the spool piece bus bars within the quadrupole 
cold mass makes continuity errors very likely and 
consequently these errors were detected in a test 
campaign at the cold mass integrator’s premises. An 
automatic test equipment for the series testing of all spool 
piece bus bars has thus been designed and will be used for 
the verification of the circuits prior to the installation of 
the magnets in the LHC tunnel. 
 
QUENCH PROTECTION SYSTEM  
R. Denz  
 
The LHC quench protection system QPS will be fully 
operational prior to beam commissioning. Although all 
QPS equipment is designed for high reliability and 
availability, triggers of the protection system which 
normally result in an accelerator stop, will occur in case 
in a significant number of QPS failure modes. 
 
Consequently, interventions (although time consuming) 
cannot be avoided. The QPS data acquisition system 
provides valuable information on the status of the LHC 
cold mass and possible failures inside. 
 
Magnets close to the interaction point are well covered 
by QPS but should not be necessarily regarded as “beam 
loss monitors”.  
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CONSEQUENCES OF RF SYSTEM 
FAILURES DURING LHC BEAM 
COMMISSIONING 
T. Linnecar  
 
The LHC RF system is comprised of 2 cryogenic 
modules per beam, each of which houses 4 
superconducting, 400MHz cavities. The following 
possible failure scenarios were identified (in order of 
increasing seriousness): 
• Loss of control of a single cavity due to a loop 
electronics problem or an RF power system 
failure (but not HT). 
• Loss of several cavities due to multiple failures 
of the above type, or an HT problem which 
would lead to the loss of all four cavities in one 
module. 
• Removal of one module due to a beam-vacuum 
leak, insulation vacuum leak, power or HOM 
coupler failure. 
For up to ½ nominal intensity with 25ns spacing or 
nominal intensity with 75ns spacing, the beam will 
probably survive the trip of 2-3 cavities. At half of these 
beam currents the beam can survive a trip of one complete 
module. To cope with this it is necessary to work at or 
near half de-tuning and slightly below the optimum Qext. 
In addition, when control of a cavity is lost with beam in 
the machine, the tuner and coupling should be blocked. 
Up to half nominal intensity a new injection can take 
place with up to 4 cavities off, if control of the tuner and 
coupling is retained. For this to work, the tuning is set to ~ 




INITIAL COMMISSIONING OF 
CRITICAL BEAM INSTRUMENTATION 
SYSTEMS 
B. Holzer  
 
A well defined installation and test procedure 
combined with the use of pre-formed coaxial cables 
should ensure that the number of BPM polarity errors 
within the cryostat is very low. All cabling errors before 
the front-end electronics will be impossible to verify 
remotely after installation, but can be detected with beam 
and visually inspected. Errors after the electronics are 
easier to track down and should be spotted during 
hardware commissioning. 
It was stressed that good database management is 
required both during installation and commissioning. In 
particular, the BPM output ports have to be matched to 
the beam1 and beam2 locations, which change from 
sector to sector, and within a sector for rotated cryostats. 
During operation the right calibration and linearization 
factors from the database have to be applied for a given 
BPM and its associated electronic cards. 
For the BLM system normal beam operation does not 
allow checks for availability, channel mix-up or position 
errors. During installation each chamber will therefore be 
individually tested with a source to verify the channel 
matching and chamber gain. It will also be possible to put 
a high voltage modulation on all chambers before 
injection to check the availability of the system as a 
whole. 
A sector test is considered useful for commissioning 
both BPM and BLM systems. In particular, for the BLM 
system it would allow quench level calibration and 
verification of longitudinal loss patterns. Considering the 
complexity of these systems and the time needed to 
implement changes or fix problems, the earlier full 
systems tests are performed the better. 
 
THE ESTIMATION OF INDIVIDUAL AND 
COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION DOSES 
FOR THE LHC BEAM CLEANING 
INSERTIONS 
M. Brugger  
 
It is very important at this stage of the LHC 
development to identifying critical interventions in order 
to suggest improvements and perform possible 
optimisation. This is required to prepare the staged 
installation of various LHC components, to prepare the 
contracts for external companies intervening in high 
radiation areas (who have to be certified) and to collect 
input for INB reports. 
Detailed Monte-Carlo simulations are now available 
for the IR7 collimator region, which is expected to be one 
of the most radioactive areas in the LHC. Intervention 
scenarios have been collected from most groups involved 
in this region, from which individual and collective dose 
rates have been estimated. This has enabled several 
optimisations to be proposed, such as the use of chain 
clamps (reducing the individual dose by 2/3) and 
permanent bake-out equipment (reducing the individual 
and collective dose by a factor 5). 
If the results from IR7 are compared to SPS 
experience, it becomes clear that we will face 
significantly higher individual and collective doses in the 
LHC. Without improvements long down-times will have 
to be accepted, at least for collimators showing the 
highest remanent dose rates. 
 
THE LHC ACCESS SYSTEM: WHY DO 
WE PUT DOORS? 
L. Scibile  
The LHC access system is comprised of two parts, a 
highly reliable interlock safety system and an industrial 
access control system. It is there to protect personnel 
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during beam operation and allow access to the machine 
when certain safety conditions are met. 
The access control system is there to identify and 
authorise the user and allow automatic or remote access 
control. This contract is in place and site acceptance is 
expected for June 2005. 
The access safety system is a distributed, highly 
reliable interlock system (Safety Integrity Level SIL 3). 
Prototyping of the hardware and software architecture is 
underway. This system will be completely tested before 
the cold check out. For the time being this is in line with 
the LHC planning, with no major technical issues left to 
be solved. 
There is a special request to the AB Department to 
finalise the list of equipment which needs to be 
interlocked with the access system. 
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